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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
rehabilitation and fitness to again be an active, productive member
of the profession. A preliminary fixed time attached to suspension
is unimportant. The important factor is that the suspension remains
in force until the attorney has borne the responsibility of regaining
his prior rational condition to the satisfaction of the court. The
deterrent factor and protection for the public exist, because, as
long as the attorney shows no rehabilitation, it is as effective as a
disbarment, as the suspension will never be lifted. But, in addition,
the future status of the attorney is considered in allowing him
the opportunity to prove rehabilitation and repentance, with a
resulting reward of reinstatement.
Robert Brand Stone
Conflict of Laws-Torts-Lex Loci Delicti
Yielding to Significant Contacts
W, who was a passenger in an automobile driven by H, brought
an action against H seeking damages for personal injuries sustained
from H's alleged negligent operation of the automobile. The trip
originated and was to have ended in New Hampshire, the domicile
of the parties. The accident occurred in Vermont which has a
guest statute. The action was instituted in New Hampshire, which
has no guest statute, and W moved for a pre-trial order that the
substantive law of New Hampshire govern the rights of the parties.
All questions of law raised by the motion were reserved and trans-
ferred without ruling. Held, Vermont's guest statute will not govern
the rights of these parties simply because the injury occurred in
Vermont. The circumstances under which a guest passenger has
a right of action against the driver of an automobile for injuries
suffered as a result of the latter's negligence will be determined
by the local law of their common domicile, if, at least, this is the
state from which they departed on their trip and the state to
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The court in the Clark case adopted the "significant contacts"
doctrine,' often referred to as the center of gravity theory, with
limited comment on its merits or shortcomings and proceeded to
discuss what it considered to be the relevant considerations upon
which choice of law decisions ought to be based. The court con-
cluded that such decisions ought to be based directly on pre-
dictability of result, maintenance of reasonable orderliness and good
relationship between the states, simplification of judicial task, ad-
vancement of state governmental interest and preference for sounder
rule of law. The decision which resulted was simply an example
of applying a fact situation to this "standard" laid out by the court.
Although the decision does not give the New Hampshire practitioner
the measure of predictibility he had under the old "place of the
injury" rule, he does, however, have a workable standard for
weighing his client's facts in predicting the choice of law which the
court will make. This is a refinement of Babcock v. Jackson2
which left the New York court with the necessity of determining
ad hoc the jurisdiction having the paramount relation.3 Such
refinement stands as an answer to the critics of the modem trend
who contend that only if the law of the place of the tort is applied
can there be any practical method for determining the law govern-
ing the particular case.'
In holding that lex loci delicti is no longer a workable rule in
tort cases, the courts have almost uniformly pointed to the prior
dissolution of the rule in contract cases.' One writer argues that if
the "significant contacts" doctrine is accepted for contracts, then
1 The well established conflict of laws rule in tort actions is that the
law of the state where the tort was committed governs the substantive rights
of the parties. There is a growing number of states which are abandoning this
rule in favor of a balancing of the "significant contacts" approach. See
Comment, 67 W. VA. L. REv. 304 (1965), for a general discussion on the
initial development of this trend. Also see Comment, 68 W. VA. L. REv. 407
(1965), for a discussion of the influence this trend has had on interspousal
immunity. The scope of the present comment has been limited to comple-
menting these two previous comments.
2 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). This was
the first case to apply the "significant contacts" test, as such, to a tort situa-
tion.
a O'Rourke Analysis of the Contacts Test: A Numerical Evaluation of
Babcock v. Jackson, 11 PRAc. LAw. 87 (May 1965).
4Sparks, Babcock v. Jackson- A Practicing Attorney's Reflections Upon
the Opinion And Its Implications, 31 INS. COUNSEL J. 428 (1964).
sWatts v. Pioneer Corn Co., Inc., 342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965); Bab-
cock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
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surely it should be applied in tort situations.6 His argument is
based on two contentions: (1) the doctrine would be less cumber-
some in torts than in contracts because there are fewer variables
and in most situations there would be no need to look beyond the
law of the place of the wrong, and (2) the doctrine has been adopt-
ed in contract law while subject to a major objection which does
not affect tort law, i.e., produces uncertainty in business matters.
West Virginia through adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code has given legislative approval to the "significant contacts"
doctrine in contract law." Since positive acts of the legislature
resulting in statutory law are a part of the "public policy" of West
Virginia,' there is little question but that in West Virginia lex loci
will yield to lex fori in cases involving the Uniform Commercial
Code. The argument naturally follows that such legislative ap-
proval of the "significant contacts" doctrine supplies the court with
one ground for judicial endorsement in tort cases.9
Babcock v. Jackson"0 pointed to a variety of decisions, both
recent and of earlier origin, which though not expressly adopting
the "center of gravity" theory did in fact weigh the contacts or
interest of the involved jurisdictions in determining which law
should be applied. These included cases relating to workmen's
compensation, torts arising out of contracts, survival of a tort claim,
intrafamiliar immunity and statutory liability. Though the differ-
ences in these cases are many, there is a common thread running
through all these decisions, i.e., by one rationale or another the
court did not apply the law of the "pace of the tort," but rather
applied the law of a more interested jurisdiction. Though this line
of cases cannot be said to be precedent for a court's adopting the
"center of gravity" theory, they certainly do show that its adoption
would not be a sudden break with traditional holdings but rather
would be the result of the gradual, orderly development of the law.
It is in these early cases, which Judge Fuld" felt were mere
forerunners to the "center of gravity" theory, that it could be argued
6 Morris, The Proper Law of A Tort, 64 H~Av. L. REv. 881 (1951).7 W. VA. CODE, cb. 46, art. 1, § 105 (Michie 1966).
8 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935).
9 Wlcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965); Griffith
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
10 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
11 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
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the West Virginia court has prepared itself to go along with the
modem trend. In Poling v. Poling2 the court did not apply the law
of the place of the tort but rather applied the law of the forum
state, i.e., West Virginia. In that decision the court reasoned that
"the Alabama rule, permitting a husband or wife to sue the other
for damages for personal injury . . . is out of harmony with pro-
nounced public policy of this state."'3 In light of this old case
it is interesting to note that in 1966 the Supreme Court of Minnesota
reached the same result in a family immunity situation, i.e., applied
the law of the domicile (forum) state, citing and following the
reasoning of the "center of gravity" cases.' 4 Another West Virginia
case which fits into Judge Fuld's forerunner cases is Gooding v.
Ott.'5 This was a workmen's compensation case resulting in a
recovery by a widow whose husband was injured while temporarily
at work in a part of a mine extending into Maryland. The Work-
men's Compensation Act contained the provision that disbursement
of the fund could be made only when the employees "shall have
received injuries in this state in the course of and resulting from
their employment."' 6 Notwithstanding this express language to
the contrary, the court allowed recovery for the out of state injury
stating that to hold otherwise "would be out of harmony with
other provisions of the act, and will work gross injustice to those
required to contribute to the compensation fund."'7 These two
cases would seem to provide adequate groundwork for the West
Virginia court to do away with the "place of the injury" concept
without having to take a position completely adverse to past
holdings.
In direct opposition to the above argument are the many
West Virginia cases applying the "place of the injury" rule.'8 In
fact the court has had much experience in dealing with gross
' 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935); The rule was also applied in
Campbell v. Campbell, 145 W. Va. 245, 114 S.E.2d 406 (1960).
'
3 Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 192, 179 S.E. 604, 606 (1935).
14 Balts v. Baits, 142 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1966). Minnesota has likewise
abandoned the lex loci delicti rule in a case involving a guest statute. Kopp
v. Rechtzigel, 141 N.W.2d 526 (Minn. 1966).
1577 W. Va. 487, 87 S.E. 862 (1916).16 d. at 489, 87 S.E. at 862.
17Id. at 490, 87 S.E. at 863.
,6 See, e.g., Fomey v. Morrison, 144 W. Va. 722, 110 S.E.2d 840
(1959)- Dallas v. Whitney, 118 W. Va. 106, 188 S.E. 766 (1936); Schade
v. Smith, 117 W. Va. 703, 188 S.E. 114 (1936); Clise v. Prunty, 108 W. Va.
635, 152 S.E. 201 (1930); Owen v. Appalachian Power Co., 78 W. Va. 596,
89 S.E. 262 (1916).
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negligence under the guest statutes of other states. 9 Apparently the
court, in the past, has rejected the idea that failure of the legislature
to adopt a guest statute in West Virginia established a public
policy against their being applied to West Virginia citizens in
West Virginia courts." In fact, without specifically stating it, the
court in these guest statute cases has been following the rule that
difference with respect to the degree of negligence (gross v.
simple) between lex loci delicti and lex fori will not be grounds
for the forum court to find the law of the place of the injury
repugnant to the law of the forum." In light of these foreign
guest statute cases in West Virginia, it becomes apparent that the
final determination when the "center of gravity" concept is
tested in the West Virginia court will depend upon the weight the
court gives to stare decisis. Other courts confronted with pre-
cedent in these cases have almost uniformily stated that stare
decisis has little significance with respect to unintentional torts
where the wrongdoer's conduct is not planned.2
The principal case refines Babcock v. Jackson by combining the
"center of gravity" rule in torts with a workable standard that can
be applied in every case. There is West Virginia statutory and
case law similar to that which in other jurisdictions proved to be
somewhat persuasive in adopting the "significant contacts" concept.
Whether the West Virginia court, when confronted with the issue,
will yield to such persuasion or whether they will wait for further
refinement is a question which depends largely on the weight the
court will give to stare decisis.
K. Paul Davis
19 See, e.g., Thornsbury, Adm'r. v. Thomsbury, 147 W. Va. 771 131
S.E.2d 713 (1963); Dodr,51 v. Young, 143 W. Va. 429, 102 S.E.2d 724(1958); Grim v. Moore, 121 W. Va. 299, 3 S.E.2d 448 (1939); White v.
Hale, 118 W. Va. 85, 188 S.E. 768 (1936); Wood v. Shrewsbury, 117 W. Va.
569, 186 S.E. 294 (1936).2 0 Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965) where it
was reasoned that since the legislature had not seen fit to adopt a guest
statute it would be contrary to legislative policy to apply other than Wiscon-
sin (forum) law.
21 Annot., 84 A.L.R. 1268 (1933).
22 Balts v. Baits, 142 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1960); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26
Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
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